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THE CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION 
ACT AND THE 1988 REAL 
ESTATE ARBITRATION 
AMENDMENTS: COMING OF 
AGE? 
FRANCIS O. SPALDING* 
I. INTRODUCTION: ODD BEDFELLOWS 
In 1988, the California Legislature enacted one of the long-
est, and in many ways one of the most significant, amendments 
to the California Arbitration Act1 since the adoption of that Act 
in 19612. Assembly Bill No. 1240, carried by Assemblyman By-
ron Sher, Democrat of Palo Alto, was introduced on March 3, 
1987 under the extra-legislative sponsorship of the California 
Association of Realtors. Chaptered on September 14, 1988, after 
significant legislative markup over two sessions, the Bill added 
to the Act Sections 1298-1298.8,3 its first provisions dealing ex-
* Francis O. Spalding, B.A. Yale University 1950, J.D. magna cum laude Northwest-
ern University School of Law 1964. Francis O. Spalding, who served as Professor of Law 
and Assistant and Associate Dean of Northwestern University School of Law between 
1965 and 1982, has been an arbitrator and mediator of commercial, real estate, securities, 
employment relations and other disputes in Northern California since 1982. 
1. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoe. §§ 1280-1297.432 (West 1991). 
2. See generally Recommendation Relating to Arbitration (Dec. 1960), 3 Cal. Law 
Revision Com.; Feldman, Arbitration Modernized--The New California Arbitration Act, 
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 413 (1961). 
3. As with earlier provisions of the Arbitration Act, this new enactment implicitly 
reserves for possible later additions a number of section numbers within the range used. 
The sections actually included in this enactment are: 
§ 1298(a)-(e). As discussed infra in note 5, A.B. 405, a cleanup bill enacted so as to 
become operative on the same date as A.B. 1240, modified certain provisions of subsec-
tions (a)-(d) of § 1298. As now in force, §§ 1298(a) and (b) are quoted in full infra at 
note 17; § 1298(c) is quoted in full infra at notes 18 and 19; § 1298(d) is quoted in full 
infra at pp. 328-29; and § 1298(e) is quoted in full infra at p. 328. § 1298.5, quoted in full 
infra at note 60. § 1298.7, quoted in full infra at pp. 332-33. § 1298.8, quoted in full infra 
at note 12. 
307 
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pressly with arbitration clauses in real estate contracts.' Under 
Section 1298.8, the provisions of this new enactment became op-
erative, and apply to contracts entered into on or after July 1, 
1989.11 
Perhaps it might be thought that, with a piece of the Arbi-
tration Act all its own at last, California real estate arbitration 
has come of age. Certainly it has joined a select circle. Hereto-
fore, among private domestic arbitrations only medical malprac-
tice arbitrations have been thought to require this kind of spe-
cific mention and treatment in the California Act.6 Yet 
thousands of real estate disputes have been arbitrated in Cali-
fornia without the blessing of specific statutory mention, under 
the terms of the Act applicable generally to "agreements"7 or 
"written agreements,"6 whatever the subject matter. Indeed, in 
mid-1988, almost a full year before the effective date of Sections 
1298-1298.8, the aforementioned California Association of Real-
tors9 saw fit to add to its standard sample set of real estate con-
tract forms new versions of many of its most basic 
forms-deposit receipts, investment purchase contracts and list-
ing agreements-that included an optional arbitration clause.1o 
This step on the part of so important a supplier of real estate 
4. The only other section of the Act in force at the time of enactment of §§ 1298-
1298.8 having even a remote explicit connection with real estate matters is § 1281.5, 
which provides a procedure for recording and enforcement of a mechanic's lien without 
waiver of an otherwise enforceable right to arbitrate. See infra pp. 331-32. Section 
1281.8(b), added in 1989, allows parties to arbitration agreements to seek "a provisional 
remedy in connection with an arbitrable controversy ... upon the ground that the award 
... [in that controversy) may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief." § 
1281.8(b). Provisional relief is defined in § 1281.8(a) to include, inter alia, issuance of a 
writ of possession and appointment of a receiver. 
5. A.B. 405, also carried by Assemblyman Sher, was enacted May 25, 1989 as an 
urgency measure to become operative on July I, 1989, concurrent with AB 1240. This 
Bill revised §§ 1298 principally by adding the modifier "binding" to each definitional 
reference to "arbitration" in §§ 1298(a) and (b) in order to make to make clear the inap-
plicability of these provisions to real estate disputes subject to judicial or court-annexed 
arbitration under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1141.10-.32. Under these sections, particularly 
§§ 1141.11 and 1141.20, judicial arbitration is generally mandatory but non-binding; ar-
bitrations under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1280-1298.8, on the other hand, are generally 
voluntary but binding. As to A.B. 405, see also notes 16 and 58, infra. 
6. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1295. See infra note 25. 
7. [d. § 1280(a). 
8. [d. § 1280(f). 
9. See supra p. 307. 
10. Cal. Ass'n of Realtors, Real Estate Standard Forms Sample Packet, Summer 
1988. 
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contract forms constitutes persuasive evidence, if the proposi-
tion were subject to any doubt, that arbitration has long been 
widely accepted and used in this field without benefit of statu-
tory sections specially addressed to real estate transactions.11 
Why, then, did the Legislature think it appropriate to add 
these novel provisions, specific to real estate contracts, to the 
Califorpia Arbitration Act? In so doing, did the Legislature do 
its technical work of legislative draftsmanship well? Beyond lan-
guage, did it adopt wise policies governing the arbitration of real 
estate disputes? Because of the structure and content of Sec-
tions 1298-1298.8, it is simplest to divide these inquiries, consid-
ering separately, on the one hand, the provisions of Section 
11. Because arbitration is a private rather than a public process; because adminis-
trative organizations may have proprietary, competitive or other reasons for keeping in-
formation about case loads confidential; because such statistics as are available may not 
be kept or published in categories that address the inquiry at hand, useful statistics are 
not always easy to come by. The American Arbitration Association (hereinafter "the 
AAAn ), certainly both the oldest (founded 1926) and the largest domestic administering 
organization, is generally forthcoming with figures and often supplies or can make availa-
ble statistics on its case load that are revealing. An AAA press release dated October 3, 
1990, for example, reports: 
The [AAA) reported today real estate claims filed [nation-
wide) in the past three years increased by 120%. There were 
510 cases filed in 1987, [548 in 1988) and 1125 in 1989. Real 
estate disputes, as indicated by case filings, are strong again 
this year with 1062 cases filed as of August 1990. 
Statistics distributed ai the AAA's San Francisco Arbitration Day programs in 1988, 
1989 and 1990 reported total national AAA commercial case filings for these same years. 
If, as appears, these statistics are comparable, the real estate filings reported by the 1990 
press release constitute the following percentages of the AAA's total commercial filings 
in these years: 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION NATIONAL CASE FILINGS 
Total Coinmercial Real Estate Real Estate 
Year Case Filings Claims Filed Per Cent of Total 
1987 9,533 510 5.35% 
1988 10,979 548 4.99 
1989 12,206 1,125 9.22 
An unpublished compilation of real estate case filings for the California regions of the 
AAA (San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego and, since 1989, Orange County) suggest 
comparable growth there, on a higher base: 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION CALIFORNIA CASE FILINGS 
Total Commercial Real Estate Real Estate 
Year Case Filings Claims Filed Per Cent of Total 
1987 2,280 221 9.69% 
1988 2,715 252 9.28 
1989 3,139 531 16.92 
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1298(a), (b) and (c) that require the use of specific boilerplate 
language in arbitration clauses applicable to real estate con-
tracts; and, on the other, those of Sections 1298(d) and (e) and 
of 1298.5 and 1298.7 that address other aspects of the arbitra-
tion of real estate disputes. 12 
These relatively narrow inquiries may satisfy the curiosity 
of those whose interest to arbitration is limited to the real estate 
sphere. Those interested in the efficacy and utility of arbitration 
generally, however, should consider as well how this major addi-
tion may play on a wider stage; for viewed in the larger context 
of the California Arbitration Act as a whole, this new enactment 
suggests these additional questions: what significance might 
these provisions, addressed in terms exclusively to arbitration of 
real estate disputes, have for the future of California arbitration 
law generally, and what effect, if any, might they have upon Cal-
ifornia's role as a bellwether in the development of modern arbi-
tration law? 
This article, after addressing the foregoing questions, con-
cludes with some thoughts on amending statutes in general, and 
the California Arbitration Act in particular. 
II. SECTIONS 1298(a)-(c): LIFE IN A BOILERPLATE 
FACTORY 
A. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
California courts have declared repeatedly over the years 
that arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution in 
California.1s On their face, Sections 1298(a)-(c) do not seem to 
12. Section 1298.8, the only other section added by A.B. 1240, serves only to estab-
lish the operative date, and to limit the Act's applicability to contracts or agreements 
entered into after that date: 
This title shall become operative on July 1, 1989, and shall 
only apply to contracts or agreements entered into on or after 
that date. 
See supra p. 308. 
13. See, e.g., Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc., v. 100 Oak 
Street, 35 Cal. 3d 312, 322, 673 P.2d 251, 257, 197 Cal. Rptr. 581, 587 (1983); ; Keating v. 
Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 604, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203; 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 371 (1982), 
reu'd on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Madden 
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 17 Cal. 3d 699, 706-07, 552 P.2d 1178, 1182, 131 Cal. 
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reflect a legislative purpose wholly consistent with that frequent 
judicial declaration. 
For a start, Sections 1298(a) and (b) require that, in the 
classes of contracts to which they apply,!· the arbitration clause 
be "clearly titled 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES.''' "Clear ti-
tle," however, is not enough: in a printed form, the phrase (and 
perhaps the entire clause-one of a number of ambiguities in the 
act) 111 must meet specific requirements of a kind once more fa-
miliar to typographers and graphic artists than to lawyers, 
judges and arbitrators: "at least 8-point bold type" if in the 
same color as the rest of the contract or, if in "contrasting red" 
then in "at least 8-point type."16 In a typed contract, the phrase 
must be "set out in capital letters."l? 
Rptr. 882, 886 (1976). 
14. See infra pp. 317-18. 
15. See infra pp. 317-18; see also pp. 319-21. 
16. As originally enacted, §§1298(a) and (b) called for printing this required title 
either in lO-point bold type if in the color of the rest of the contract, or, alternatively, in 
"8-point type"-presumably in normal, or roman, rather than bold, face-if in "contrast-
ing red." A.B. 405 included this simplification in typographic requirements-one that 
seems to a lawyer salutary if modest, however it might strike a typographer. See supra 
note 5. 
17. As now in force, §§ 1298(a) and (b) read: 
(a) Whenever any contract to convey real property, or contem-
plated to convey real property in the future, including market-
ing contracts, deposit receipts, real property sales contracts as 
defined in Section 2985 of the Civil Code, leases together with 
options to purchase, or ground leases coupled with improve-
ments, but not including powers of sale contained in deeds of 
trust or mortgages, contains a provision for binding arbitration 
of any dispute between the principals in the transaction, the 
contract shall have that provision clearly titled "ARBITRA-
TION OF DISPUTES." 
If a provision for binding arbitration is included in a 
printed contract, it shall be set out in at least 8-point bold 
type or in contrasting red in at least 8-point type, and if the 
provision is included in a typed contract, it shall be set out in 
capital letters. 
(b) Whenever any contract or agreement between principals 
and agents in real property sales transactions, including listing 
agreements, as defined in Section 1086 of the Civil Code; con-
tains a provision requiring binding arbitration of any dispute 
between the principals and agents in the transaction, the con-
tract or agreement shall have that provision clearly titled 
"ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES." 
If a provision for binding arbitration is included in a 
printed contract, it shall be set out in at least 8-point bold 
type or in contrasting red in at least 8-point type, and if the 
5
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Section 1298(c) goes beyond the title of the arbitration 
clause to require specific language of warning, with typeface re-
quirements similar to those of Sections 1298(a) and (b):18 all 
caps if typed; or "at least 10-point bold type" if in the same 
color as the rest of the contract or, if in "contrasting red" then 
in "at least 8-point bold type. IIlS 
provision is included in a typed contract, it shall be set out in 
capital letters. 
Since the advent of laser printers, it has become ever easier to produce, at a lawyer's 
or legal secretary's desk, both what looks like traditional "printing" and what looks like 
traditional "typing," perhaps even in a single pass over a blank sheet of paper. One may 
hope, without great optimism, that we may somehow be spared litigation over whether a 
particular laser-printed contract is "printed" or "typed." 
18. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1298(c) reads: 
Immediately before the line or space provided for the parties 
to indicate their assent or non assent to the arbitration provi-
sion described in subdivision (a) or (b), and immediately fol-
lowing that arbitration provision, the following shall appear: 
"NOTICE: BY INITIALLING IN THE SPACE BELOW 
YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARIS-
ING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBI-
TRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION DECIDED BY 
NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALIFOR-
NIA LAW AND YOU ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHT YOU 
MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED 
IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIALLING IN THE 
SPACE BELOW YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL 
RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, UNLESS 
THOSE RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN 
THE 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION. IF 
YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AFTER 
AGREEING TO THIS PROVISION, YOU MAYBE COM-
PELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. YOUR 
AGREEMENT TO THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION IS 
VOLUNTARY." "WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND 
THE FOREGOING AND AGREE TO SUBMIT DISPUTES 
ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 
'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION TO NEU-
TRAL ARBITRATION." 
19. At first blush, the concluding language of § 1298(c) seems not unlike the parallel 
provision in in §§ 1298(a) and (b): 
If the above provision is included in a printed contract, it 
shall be set out in at least 10-point bold type or in contrasting 
red print in at least 8-point bold type, and if the provision is 
included in a typed contract, it shall be set out in capital 
letters. 
Compare supra note 17. Close examination, however, reveals that the typeface require-
ments here are not the same as in §§ 1298(a) and (b): here, if printed in black (or in the 
same color as the rest of the contract) this warning must be in lO-point bold (rather than 
8-point bold) type, as in §§ 1298(a) and (b); while if "contrasting red print" is used, the 
6
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Section 1298(c) goes somewhat further, however, albeit in a 
fashion that is oblique if not downright backhanded. Still an-
other requirement, applicable to arbitration clauses in real es-
tate contracts alone, seems to lurk in the reference to a "line or 
space provided for the parties to indicate their assent or nonas-
sent to the arbitration provision described in subdivision (a) or 
(b)." The opening phrase of boilerplate warning itself refers 
again to this same "line or space:" "NOTICE: BY INITIALING 
IN THE SPACE BELOW .... " Perhaps it might be thought 
that the signature lines at the end of the entire contract could 
be considered the "line or space;" Section 1298(c), however, is 
not so easily satisfied. It would seem that the statute requires 
that these elements appear in this order and juxtaposition: 
1. " The arbitration provision," meaning the sub-
stantive terms thereof; 
2. The 14S-word boilerplate warning, which must 
"immediately follow" the arbitration provision, 
and which must be "immediately before" 
3. "The line or space provided for the parties to 
indicate their assent or nonassent .... " 
Thus, unless the arbitration provision and the warning are the 
very last provisions of the contract, the statute now seems to 
require, as to the class of contracts covered,20 that there be a 
separate written assent to the arbitration clause-a requirement 
without parallel anywhere else in the California law of 
arbitration.21 
Whatever the precise dimensions of the requirements of sec-
tions 1298(a)-(c), it seems fair to conclude from these portions of 
the new enactment that the Legislature entertained as its princi-
pal purpos.e the desire to inform, through the medium of boiler-
warning must be in 8-point bold type (rather than in the 8-point normal (or roman) 
permissible under §§ 1298(a) and (b». While A.B. 405 simplified the typographic re-
quirements of §§ 1298(a) and (b) somewhat, it made no change in the language of A.B. 
1240 as to the parallel provision of § 1298(c). See supra notes 16 and 17. There is neither 
evident reason nor obvious justification for the extraordinarily confusing melange of 
typeface requirements that results within the narrow compass of § 1298. Perhaps the 
cautious lawyer should consider adding a typescaling rule to his or her desk equipment. 
20. See infra pp. 319-21. 
21. As to medical malpractice arbitration, Section 1295(b) deals with this problem 
by directing that the all-cap boilerplate warning appear "immediately before the signa-
ture line provided for the individual contracting for the medical services." See infra note 
25. 
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plate, those who may be considering inclusion of an arbitration 
clause in their real estate contracts of some of the differences 
between arbitration and litigation. The penalty for omitting or 
departing from the mandatory text is not stated, but it may be 
inferred: invalidation of any purported arbitration clause that 
does not meet all of the stated requirements.22 
B. LEGISLATIVE HANDIWORK: WHAT DID MUMBLES SAY? 
The proposition that the consumer should be better in-
formed is unarguable. Two questions follow, however: first, 
whether the boilerplate addressed to "consumers"-here, parties 
to real estate contracts-in hopes of achieving this purpose is 
clear enough and easily enough understood to have a realistic 
chance of accomplishing that end; and, second, whether the 
more technical provisions governing the use of the required boil-
erplate-the language addressed not to consumers but to real es-
tate professionals and their lawyers-is reasonably clear and 
intelligible. 
1. Drafting the Boilerplate: Getting It Right 
The language of warning required by Section 1298(c) is 
hardly felicitous. The attempt, essentially, is to summarize, in 
something under 150 words, a subject on which books have been 
written.23 Inevitably such an attempt produces awkward or im-
precise phrasing-"court or jury trial," for example, or "judicial 
rights to discovery and appeal." 
More particularly, as to the main message of the Section 
1298(c) warning, the similarly intended requirement applicable 
to medical service contract arbitration clauses, found in Section 
1295 of the Act,24 is flagged in a relatively simple 38-word state-
ment limited, essentially, to conveying the advice that signing 
the "court or jury trial."21i The warning of Section 1298, by con-
22. Cf. Rosenfield v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 198, 191 Cal.Rptr. 611 (1983), 
which adopts this approach as to a case falling under § 1295. See generally infra note 25. 
23. See, e.g., M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1990). 
24. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1295. 
25. The boilerplate language required by § 1295(b) reads: 
"NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE 
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MAL-
8
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trast, runs to some 148 words, adding not only the reference to 
the possible loss of "judicial rights to discovery and appeal," and 
a 28-word warning about the consequences of failing to submit 
to arbitration after agreeing to do so, but also a good deal of 
unwelcome general prolixity.26 
PRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION 
AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY 
OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS 
CONTRACT." 
The last sentence of this warning reflects the requirement of § 1295(a) that any arbitra-
tion clause covering disputes as to professional malpractice in a contract for medical 
services "shall have such provision as the first article of the contract .... " That section 
goes on to require that the arbitration clause-that is, Article 1 of the contract-shall be, 
in terms: 
It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, 
that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this 
contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improp-
erly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be deter-
mined by submission to arbitration as provided by California 
law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as 
California law provides for judicial review of arbitration pro-
ceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are 
giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute 
decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are ac-
cepting the use of arbitration. 
As to this aspect of § 1295(a), if this requirement should be read to limit the arbitration 
clause to this language (rather than simply to require that the agreement include this 
language) the parties to such a contract are hamstrung in any attempt to tailor the terms 
of their arbitration clause. See infra note 44. Nor does the language appear to be per-
fectly designed for ready understanding by the average lay reader-albeit that in this 
respect it is far superior to the language of § 1298, discussed supra. 
Nor is it wholly clear what the effect of the choice of California arbitration law effec-
tively compelled by this boilerplate would be in a case, if one should arise, as to which 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, is applicable-that is, essentially, a case 
arising out of "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," id. at § 2. It was 
held in Volt Information Sciences, Inc., v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989) that even in such a case the parties, by virtue of so 
modest a device as a general choice of law clause electing to apply the law of the situs of 
the project contracted for, might effectively agree to follow California law including pro-
visions of the California Arbitration Act inconsistent with those of the Federal Act. See 
also infra note 56. 
At least, however, under § 1295, only the "NOTICE" required by § 1295(b) is sub-
ject to specific typographic requirements-there, "10-point bold red type" (and, since it 
so appears in the statute, presumably all capital letters as well). The longer and more 
discursive additional text requirement of § 1295(a), so far as appears, may be in ordinary 
upper and lower case. See infra note 27. As to the positioning of this notice, see supra 
note 21. 
26. For example, for "your right to a court or jury trial" in § 1295, § 1298(c) substi-
tutes "any right you might possess to have the dispute litigated in a court or jury 
trial"-exactly twice as many words. 
9
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Moreover, Section 1298(c) introduces another kind of clarity 
problem-one well understood by typographers and commercial 
art directors (and even by some lawyers who have begun to use 
desktop publishing in their practices), if not, apparently, by the 
members of the California Legislature: that all-cap type is sub-
stantially more difficult to read than type set in upper and lower 
case/I? To be sure, the literal requirement of the statute is that 
the warning paragraph appear all in caps only in a typed con-
27. See, e.g., R. PARKER, LOOKING GOOD IN PRINT 36 (1988): 
Headlines set in upper-case type occupy more space and slow 
readers down. Readers are unaccustomed to words set exclu-
sively in upper-case type, which are difficult to view at a 
glance. In general, limit upper-case headlines to two or three 
words. 
In subsequent chapters entitled "Building Blocks of Design," id. at 45-63, and "Tools of 
Emphasis," id. at 65-76 (which begins with the caveat, "The tools of emphasis are most 
effective when used with restraint"), the same volume discusses dozens of ways of adding 
emphasis to printed text, including bold type, id. at 51-52, and color, id. at 67-68; all-cap 
type is nowhere mentioned in these pages. 
In R. PARKER, NEWSLETTERS FROM THE DESKTOP 90 (1990), the same author adds 
another element to the explanation: 
The main problem with uppercase type is that it's hard to 
read. Lowercase ascenders and descenders help the reader 
identify the letters and recognize words, whereas' uppercase 
shapes blend together into uniform rectangles. 
The reader who remains in doubt about the relative legibility of all-cap and upper 
and lower case styles may compare the ease and speed with which he or she can read and 
understand the following side-by-side renditions of the warning of § 1298(c), which differ 
only in the use of type cases: 
10
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tract,28 but both the lawbook publishers and the formsellers 
seem to be following the style of the Legislature's slip version of 
the new enactment in printing this language of the statute all in 
caps.29 
A more serious problem of clarity, tracing to ambiguity in 
the boilerplate provisions, lies in substantially identical provi-
sions of Sections 1298(a) and (b). In each of these sections, after 
setting out the requirement for "clearly titling" the arbitration 
clause "ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" in the classes of con-
tracts covered,30 the statutory language continues, "If a provi-
"NOTICE: BY INITIALLING IN THE "Notice: By initialling in the space below 
SPACE BELOW YOU ARE AGREEING you are agreeing to have any dispute arising 
TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT out of the matters included in the 'ARBI-
OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE TRATION OF DISPUTES' provision de-
'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVI- cided by neutral arbitration as provided by 
SION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBI- California law and you are giving up any 
TRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALIFOR- right you might possess to have the dispute 
NIA LAW AND. YOU ARE GIVING UP litigated in a court of jury trial. By initial-
ANY RIGHT YOU MIGHT POSSESS TO ling in the space below you are giving up 
HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED IN A your judicial rights to discovery and appeal, 
COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIAL- unless those rights are specifically included 
LING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE in the 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' 
GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL RIGHTS provision. If you refuse to submit to arbi-
TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL. UN- tration after agreeing to this provision, you 
LESS THOSE RIGHTS ARE SPECIFI- may be compelled to arbitrate under the 
CALLY INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRA- authority of the California Code of Civil 
TION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION. IF Procedure. Your agreement to this arbitra-
YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBI- tion provision is voluntary." "We have read 
TRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS and understand the foregoing and agree to 
PROVISION, YOU MAY BE COM- submit disputes arising out of the matters 
PELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE included in the 'ARBITRATION OF DIS-
AUTHORITY OF THE CALIFORNIA PUTES' provision to neutral arbitration." 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. YOUR 
AGREEMENT TO THIS ARBITRATION 
PROVISION IS VOLUNTARY." "WE 
HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE 
FOREGOING AND AGREE TO SUBMIT 
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE 
MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBI-
TRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION 
TO NEUTRAL ARBITRATION." 
28. As to typed real estate contracts, which are almost certain to have been fully 
negotiated, the policy arguments in favor of warning have far less force than in the case 
of printed form contracts. See infra pp. 326-27. See also supra note 17. 
29. See, e.g., Deering California Civil Practice Codes, Part 2 684 (1990, for use in 
1991); Professional Publishing Corp. Form 101-R.3 CAL (5-89), "second version" (see 
infra note 32). 
30. The full language relevant to the point here under discussion reads, in § 1298(a): 
Whenever any contract . . . contains a provision for binding 
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sion for arbitration is included in a printed contract it shall be 
set out in ... [stated type face requirements]." (Emphasis 
added.) Read literally and alone, this latter sentence seems 
plainly to require that the entire arbitration clause-"it"-be 
set out in the required typeface; but read together with the im-
mediately preceding sentence in the same subsection, "it" could 
be understood quite plausibly to refer to the last words of that 
preceding sentence, "ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" (which 
appear all in capitals in the statutory text). If the former is the 
correct reading, of course, the requirement in a typed contract is 
that the entire arbitration clause be typed entirely in capital 
letters.31 
Interestingly, one of the major publishers of real estate 
forms-a member of the only definable class seemingly certain 
to benefit from the enactment of Sections 1298-1298.8-appar-
endy had some initial trouble with this issue. Both in a deposit 
receipt form dated "3-89" and in another dated "5-89" Profes-
sional Publishing Corp. printed the "clear title" in 8-point bold 
type and the 1298(c) warning language in 10-point bold type but 
arbitration of any dispute ... the contract shall have that pro-
vision clearly titled "ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES." 
If a provision for binding arbitration is included in a printed 
contract, it shall be set out in at least 8-point bold type or in 
contrasting red in at least 8-point type, and if the provision is 
included in a typed contract, it shall be set out in capital 
letters. 
and, in § 1298(b): 
Whenever any contract or agreement ... contains a provision 
requiring binding arbitration of any dispute ... the contract 
or agreement shall have that provision clearly titled "ARBI-
TRATION OF DISPUTES." 
If a provision for binding arbitration is included in a printed 
contract, it shall be set out in at least 8-point bold type or in 
contrasting red in at least 8-point type, and if the provision is 
included in a typed contract, it shall be set out in capital 
letters. 
As to these terms, these provisions appear to be almost precisely parallel. Yet there are 
seemingly random differences in language between them: "contract or agreement" as op-
posed to "contract" (cf. § 1280 defining "agreement"), for example; and "provision for 
binding arbitration" as opposed to "provision requiring binding arbitration." Although 
specific problems in interpretation and application do not immediately suggest them-
selves, it is difficult to imagine a justification for such differences and, nurtured by the 
minds of inventive counsel, they may ultimately find their place in the appellate reports. 
For the full text of §§ 1298(a) and (b), see supra note 17. 
31. As to fully negotiated contracts, presumably the kind most likely to be typed, 
see pp. 326-27, infra. See also supra note 17. 
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rendered the substantive provisions of the arbitration clause it-
self in 8-point normal (or roman) type. A revised version of the 
same publisher'S deposit receipt form, also dated "5-89," appar-
ently not only caught the point noted here but also, erring on 
the side of caution, rendered the entire substance of the arbitra-
tion clause in 10-point bold--2 points, or 0.028 inches, higher 
than required by Sections 1298(a) and (b).s2 
2. Coverage Language: Who? What? Where? When? Where? 
How? 
In addition to setting out the "clear title" boilerplate re-
quirement, Sections 1298(a) and (b) establish the classes of real 
estate contracts to which all of the boilerplate requirements of 
Section 129833 apply. Far and away the most serious problems of 
clarity related to the boilerplate provisions of Section 1298 are 
to be found in this coverage language. If the boilerplate language 
itself is subject to criticism for its clumsiness and verbosity, the 
problems with the coverage language found in Section 1298(a) 
and (b) include downright impenetrability. 
32. This was by no means the only problem experienced by Professional Publishing 
in getting the boilerplate right. Its first cut at a new deposit receipt form omitted a 
substantial part of the 148-word warning of Section 1298(c). Paragraph 37 of Profes-
sional Publishing Corp. Form 101-R.3 CAL (3-89), entitled, "ARBITRATION OF DIS-
PUTES" and otherwise conforming to the verbiage requirements of § 1298(a)-(c), omit-
ted from the boilerplate language of § 1298(c) the sentence, "By initialing in the space 
below you are giving up your judicial rights to discovery and appeal, unless those rights 
are specifically included in the 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' provision." A quick 
revision corrected that error. The missing sentence was added in 11 37 of one ver-
sion-presumably the first May 1989 version-of the Professional Publishing Corp. form 
identified as Form 101-R.3 CAL (5-89). This version, however, perpetuated another er-
ror: as in the preceding version, the 1298(c) warning language came before rather than 
after the substantive provisions of the arbitration clause, as the statute directs. As noted 
supra at p. 313, § 1298(c) requires that the 148-word boilerplate warning be placed "im-
mediately before the line or space provided to indicate their assent or nonassent to the 
arbitration provision ... and immediately following that provision .... " 
It took still another revision-the third in two months-to correct that flaw,one 
that, if not caught, presumably would have risked invalidating the arbitration clause in 
any contract that used it after July 1, 1989. See supra note 22. This "second" May 1989 
version is also identified as Professional Publishing Corp. Form 101-R.3 CAL (5-89), with 
no mark or code-nothing apart from the substantial textual differences in its 11 37-to 
distinguish it from the "first" May 1989 version. It was this version that also moved to 
address the ambiguity in §§ 1298(a) and (b) by putting the entire "substantive" arbitra-
tion clause in 8-point bold type (see supra pp. 317-18, and that first printed the entire 
warning all in capital letters (see supra pp. 316-17. 
33. And presumably the rule of § 1298.7 as well; see infra pp. 332-33. 
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Section 1298(b) begins by imposing the statute's boilerplate 
requirements on contracts "between principals and agents in 
real property sales transactions . . . ." This language seems clear 
enough on its face, although it may not be immediately apparent 
why other kinds of principal-agent agreements-rental listing 
agreements, management agreements and the like-are excluded 
from apparent coverage. 
The same sentence then proceeds, however: " ... including 
listing agreements, as defined in Section 1086 of the Civil Code . 
. . . " (Emphasis added.)s. Well enough-except that, while sub-
section (e) of Civil Code Section 1086 defines a "listing"S6 as a 
contract authorizing an agent to "sell" or "find ... a buyer" for 
property, subsection (b) of Section 1086 defines "sell" and "sale" 
as including lease and exchange and subsection (c) defines 
"buyer" as including a lessee or exchange participant. Presuma-
bly the intention was to incorporate into Section 1298(b) of the 
Arbitration Act all of these Civil Code Section 1086 defini-
tions-and thus to make the subsection applicable to listing 
agreements for lease, as well as for sale. If, however, this is the 
best that the Legislature can do with statutory cross-references, 
perhaps some sort of dexterity test ought to be added to the 
"practical" section of the California bar examination. It is less 
clear how non-lawyer real estate licensees-who inevitably will 
be the ones obliged to make a high proportion of the firing-line 
decisions necessitated by this provision-are meant to cope with 
this kind of verbal juggling. 
But 1298(b) is a model of clarity compared with the mares' 
nest of Section 1298(a). That Section applies in terms to arbitra-
tion clauses in " ... any contract to convey real property, or con-
templated to convey real property in the future including mar-
keting contracts, deposit receipts, real property sales contracts 
as defined in Section 2985 of the Civil Code, leases together with 
options to purchase, or ground leases coupled with improve-
ments .... " Powers of sale in deeds of trust or mortgages are 
expressly excluded.38 
34. For the full text of §§ 1298(a) and (b), see supra note 17. 
35. Civil Code § 1086, however, neither defines nor uses the term "listing agree-
ment"-the term as to which § 1298(b) refers to § 1086 for definition. 
36. For the full text of §§ 1298(a) and (b), see supra note 17. 
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For a start, what, if you please, is a "contract ... contem-
plated to convey real property in the future" (as distinct from a 
"contract to convey real property")? Next, please define a "mar-
keting contract" (and while you are at it, please be sure to dis-
tinguish a "marketing contract" from a listing agreement as de-
fined under Civil Code Section 1086). Then perhaps you will 
explain why "real property sales agreements as defined in Civil 
Code Section 2985" (installment land contracts to you-one of 
the· genuine gooney birds of California real property law) are sin-
gled out for special mention and coverage. While some of this 
terminology may have found a place high in the analytical 
framework of certain scholars of the California law of real estate 
transactions, no part of it should be imported without definition 
into specialized corners of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure-especially where the subject at hand is a system that is 
supposed to avoid the complexities of the law and that, in evi-
dent fact, will be used frequently by non-lawyers in circum-
stances where advice of counsel (for whatever it may be worth in 
such circumstances) is nowhere in sight. 
Imprecise or impenetrable coverage definitions may be frus-
trating or worse for prospective contracting parties, but they 
should at least be good for the formsellers' business. For with 
coverage definitions as muddy as these, the only way to be cer-
tain that an arbitration clause will not be subject to invalida-
tion37 is to include the boilerplate (including every precise re-
quirement of wording and typeface and color) mandated by 
Section 1298 in any contract that might conceivably fall within 
its coverage-which means, roughly, any contract having any-
thing remotely to do with real estate. This likely means as a 
practical matter, that most real estate professionals (and per-
haps even some lawyers), should lay in a goodly supply of 
printed contract forms (once the formsellers have worked out all 
of the bugs),38 however well or ill suited they may otherwise be 
to the purpose at hand. 
A special note of caution may be in order concerning the use 
of submission agreements in real estate disputes. Most disputes 
find their way into arbitration by virtue of an arbitration clause 
37. See supra note 22. 
38. See also supra p. 318. 
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embedded (as a procedural appendage that the parties never ex-
pect to use) in a contract of wider scope dealing with substantive 
arrangements that are the motivation for the larger agreement.39 
It is also possible, however, and often desirable, to bring an ex-
isting dispute to arbitration even where the parties have not em-
bedded an arbitration clause in their original contract; this is 
accomplished by entering into a submission agreement-that is, 
a separate contract, subsequent both to the original agreement 
between the parties and to the development of a dispute be-
tween them, in which the parties agree to submit that subsisting 
dispute to arbitration. 
Readily available California real estate form contracts will 
likely continue to contain arbitration clauses that (once the bugs 
have been worked out)'o conform precisely to the boilerplate re-
quirements of Section 1298, typography, order, spacing and all; 
parties who use such forms need only initial the right boxes in 
order to embed the form arbitration clause in their agreement. It 
is much less likely, however, that it will occur to forms ellers-or 
that if it does, they will find.it economic-to market form sub-
mission agreements for real estate disputes. Yet, although the 
statute is silent on the point (and although a boilerplate warning 
about the risks of arbitration in a submission agreement is an 
oxymoron if there ever was one), there can be no guarantee 
whatsoever that Section 1298 may not be held as fully applicable 
to agreements to submit real estate disputes arising out of the 
classes of contracts covered· l as it is to arbitrations arising out 
of real estate contracts with embedded arbitration clauses. Cau-
tion would surely counsel that the boilerplate requirements of 
Sections 1298(a)-(c) be met in such submission agreements. 
Nor is it likely that the parties to such submission agree-
ments will be prompted from other quarters to be alert to the 
boilerplate requirements. The American Arbitration Associa-
tion's widely circulated Commercial Rules pamphlet,42 for exam-
39. Such clauses are sometimes described as "future disputes" clauses because they 
provide for arbitration of disputes that may arise in the future. See generally American 
Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules at 5 (as amended and in effect 
January I, 1991) [hereinafter "AAA Rules"). 
40. See supra p. 318. 
41. See supra pp. 319-20. 
42. AAA Rules, supra note 39, at 5. 
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pIe, includes both a sample embedded arbitration clause and a 
sample submission agreement. Since that pamphlet is used na-
tionally, however, and since real estate disputes make up only a 
small part of the AAA commercial case load,43 these suggested 
clauses do not, and cannot reasonably be expected to, include, or 
make any reference to, the peculiar language and typeface re-
quirements that the California Legislature has seen fit to impose 
upon real estate arbitration agreements in that State. 
C. THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM?: "ARBITRATION MAY BE HAZ-
ARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH" 
Was any of this small carload of boilerplate was really a 
necessary or desirable addition to the California Arbitration 
Act? Is there something special about real estate contracts that 
requires their being singled out for all this special attention from 
the wide array of other kinds of contracts that may contain arbi-
tration clauses? Boilerplate no doubt has some advantages. As 
noted, it is probably good for formsellers' business, and requir-
ing it by statute, perhaps, minimizes the demands of lawmaking 
put upon the Legislature; but will real estate contracts (or the 
arbitration clauses therein) be better, in some sense-in any 
sense-for having included in their baggage all the legislative 
verbiage commanded by Section 1298?" 
43. See supra note 11. 
44. The Legislature must be given credit for having avoided, once it was called to its 
attention, one potentially devastating pitfall in the original draft of A.B. 1240. As origi-
nally submitted by the California Association of Realtors, the Bill included required boil-
erplate to the effect that, by accepting the arbitration provision, the parties agreed that 
"any dispute arising out of this contract" must be arbitrated. (Emphasis added.) See 
A.B. 1240 as introduced March 7, 1987. 
The language of this original draft set up this syllogism: 
1. In order to be valid and enforceable, a contract compre-
hended by the legislation must include the precise language 
required by the statute. 
2. The precise language required by the statute provides that 
"any dispute" (which in the context would seem necessarily to 
mean "all disputes") arising out of the contract "will be deter-
mined by submission to ... arbitration .... " 
3. Therefore parties to such a contract cannot lawfully limit 
the arbitration promise in the contract to less than all dis-
putes that might arise under the contract. 
Thus, had this language survived, it would have been impossible under the Act to 
tailor a binding arbitration agreement to arbitrate some, but not all, disputes arising out 
of a real estate contract-a result that, quite unnecessarily and to no purpose, would 
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The rest of the California Arbitration Act reflects, and has 
often been interpreted to reflect, a strong policy preference for 
arbitration.4G It hardly seems likely that Sections 1298-1298.8 
were intended to abrogate that general policy preference, even 
as to real estate contracts; yet the unbendingly literal warning 
mechanism put in place by Section 1298(c), even if effective to 
achieve its protective purposes, seems to strike no balance what-
soever with the policy preference for arbitration; rather it almost 
seems designed to crush the latter policy. For it treats arbitra-
tion as if it were something akin to tobacco smoke: a threat to 
life's good things, without compensating benefit, an inferior, if 
not an unfair, alternative to litigation. 
For example, fully one-fifth of the 148 words in the boiler-
plate warning statement are devoted to this somber caution: "IF 
YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION, YOU MAY 
BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE." 
Who knows what terror the "authority of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure" may strike into the heart of a lay person, una-
ware that it is only a book? The statement is true, of course; but 
it is probably no more balanced or appropriate a warning state-
ment about arbitration than would be the warning statement 
about a judicial proceeding that, "Should you fail or refuse to 
testify fully and freely on the witness stand, the judge may order 
you to jail without trial and hold you there until you purge your-
self of your contempt." Arbitration, after all, is not without ad-
vantages. In the usual case, it is substantially faster, cheaper and 
have made arbitration both less attractive and less useful. 
A comparison of this first draft of § 1298(c) with the language of § 1295(b), supra 
note 25, suggests that the former may have been patterned originally on the latter. If so, 
this is additional evidence that, from its inception, § 1298(a)-(c) was not thought through 
with the requisite care and thoroughness. 
For § 1295(b) was part of a statutory scheme designed in terms solely for use in 
contracts of adhesion under which all disputes would be arbitrated; whereas only a small 
proportion of the contracts to which § 1298(a)-(c) would apply are contracts of adhesion 
(see infra pp. 325-27). 
Likewise, as noted supra in note 25, the contract language mandated by § 1295(b) 
could stand alone as a complete arbitration clause; and it is at least arguable that § 
1295(b) is in fact intended to insure that arbitration clauses, in the medical services 
cases to which that statute applies, are strictly limited to the language there required; 
while the boilerplate mandated by §§ 1298(a)-(c), standing alone (either in its original 
form or as ultimately enacted), would accomplish absolutely nothing by way of binding 
the parties to an arbitration promise. 
45. See supra note 13. 
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more private than litigation-particularly if the parties are will-
ing to forgo full formal discovery in favor of the kind of "discov-
ery substitutes"4e that arbitration can afford. Moreover, in arbi-
tration the parties, if they wish, can insure that the finder of fact 
is a neutral expert in the field, rather than risking entrusting 
their fate to a neutral novice. If the uninformed reader of the 
warning is get any of this side of the story, however, he or she 
must do so somewhere outside the language of Section 1298(c).47 
The statutory warning will not induce knowledgeable par-
ties to refuse an arbitration clause that they otherwise want to 
adopt; nor will knowledgeable real estate licencees and lawyers 
hesitate to explain to their clients what arbitration is and what 
its advantages and disadvantages are. But what about the rest? 
How many parties, ignorant of arbitration, will be driven off, 
still ignorant, by the threatening tenor of the boilerplate warn-
ing, or by the know-nothing advice of an agent? 
Fortunately, there is some indication that, since the advent 
of Sections 1298-1298.8, the real estate community, or segments 
of it at least, are undertaking to learn something about the arbi-
tration process. Those who are most successful in doing so will 
come to realize that arbitration is neither the religion some of its 
advocates seem to make of it, nor the devil's workshop described 
by its most committed detractors, but rather another way of 
resolving disputes-one that necessarily entails tradeoffs but one 
that at its best can get disputes resolved far faster and far more 
economically and with greater privacy than can the litigation 
alternative. 
However successful real estate professionals prove to be in 
learning to cope with the demands put upon them by Section 
1298, it is instructive, in evaluating the wisdom of this new en-
actment, to compare it with Section 1295, enacted in 1975, deal-
ing with contracts for medical services. For as noted,4S like Sec-
46. See Spalding. Avoiding Delay in Arbitration: Counsel's Role. ALTERNATIVE DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION NEWSALERT, CALIFORNIA EDITION I, 5 (March 1991). 
47. To be sure. the warning language of Section 1298(c) does seem to throw one left-
handed compliment to California arbitration--it acknowledges that any arbitration in-
volved is at least "neutral arbitration as provided by California law." Even this conces-
sion. however. carries with it the unfortunate negative implication that another kind of 
arbitration-"non-neutral"? biased?-may also be known to California law. 
48. See supra note 25. 
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tion 1298, Section 1295 features the requirement of specific 
boilerplate contract language; and for the moment, at least, 
these are the only places in the California Arbitration Act where 
such requirements are imposed upon the use of arbitration 
clauses. 
Most if not all contracts for medical services of the kind 
covered by Section 1295 are by definition contracts of adhe-
sion-that is, contracts completely drafted and offered by the 
medical service provider essentially on a take-it-or-Ieave-it ba-
sis.49 Some kinds of real estate contracts (for example, some resi-
dential apartment leases and residential loan documents) may 
be contracts of adhesion; a great many, however, are not. More-
over, again far removed from the circumstance of medical ser-
vice contracts, even those non-adhesive real estate contracts that 
are written on pre-printed forms-deposit receipt forms, for ex-
ample-almost always include, in spaces explicitly provided for 
the purpose, significant terms tailored by the agreement or nego-
tiation of the parties to the particular transaction and inserted 
by them into the finished contract. 
Of course the tailorable real estate form contract, as tailored 
by the parties to the circumstances of their transaction, will 
likely include some standardized, pre-printed lan-
guage-including, possibly, an arbitration clause. In this limited 
sense, such a real estate contract bears at least some resem-
blance to an adhesive contract for medical services. Yet the cir-
cumstances in which these two types of contract are used are 
otherwise vastly different. For one thing, in the tailor able form 
contract the standardized language is ordinarily still negotiable, 
leaving to the parties the choice whether to accept, modify or 
reject the form-drafter's suggestion; while as a practical matter 
none of the terms of the contract of adhesion, such as the typical 
medical services contract, is negotiable, leaving to the prospec-
tive subscriber only the choice whether to accept the contract as 
a whole or to reject it and seek medical services elsewhere. For 
another, even if pre-printed form language is used for the arbi-
49. Admittedly, Section 1295(e) declares that such contracts are "not contract[sl of 
adhesion, nor unconscionable nor otherwise improper," but they do fit precisely the defi-
nition of a contract of adhesion. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 
819-20; 623 P.2d 165, 172; 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 611 (1981) (contracts of adhesion are not 
unenforceable unless also unconscionable). 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/3
1991] CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION ACT 327 
tration clause in the tailorable form contract, that form language 
has not been drafted by one party-it is the product of the 
formseller, whose interest, presumably, lies in satisfying prospec-
tive parties on all sides of the transactions in question; while by 
definition the form language in an adhesive contract is drafted 
by the party with superior bargaining power. Likewise, the par-
ties to a tailorable form contract, at least in the real estate field, 
may have any imaginable permutation or combination of relative 
sophistication and bargaining power. 
Perhaps there is a case to be made for requiring boilerplate 
warning to the uninformed, if a form arbitration clause is to be 
used, both in contracts of adhesion for medical services and in 
tailorable real estate form contracts; but surely each is a quite 
different case, and whatever the case to be made for the medical 
services model it would be wholly inapposite to the circum-
stances of the real estate contract.1I0 
There are, moreover, at least two additional classes of real 
. estate contract that have no parallel, as a practical matter, in 
the modern medical services field. One, common in the real es-
tate field especially above the "retail" level (one, incidentally, 
particularly likely to involve the services of lawyers in the draft-
ing) is the genuinely and fully negotiated contract that makes no 
use whatsoever of a pre-printed form. The case for requiring 
boilerplate warning language in such a contract is hard to imag-
ine. Another class is the real estate contract-hand made or on a 
tailor able form that does not include a printed arbitration 
clause-between lay persons who are fully aware of, and desire 
to use, the arbitration process but who are unaware that the 
Legislature has adopted a boilerplate requirement. Is it really 
necessary or desirable social policy in cases such as these to put 
at risk fully negotiated arbitration provisions, if otherwise unob-
jectionable,in the service of a form of words that is, at best, tur-
gid and hard to read and, at worst, unbalanced and 
intimidating? 
Even if it is possible to make some respectable defense of 
the patent requirements of the boilerplate device employed in 
Sections 1298(a)-(c), it is impossible to conceive a defense of any 
50. See supra note 45. 
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character for such half-hidden traps for the unwary as the re-
quirement of those Sections for a separate "line or space," dif-
ferent from the signature line for the contract as a whole, upon 
which the parties must record their assent to the arbitration 
clause.61 
Regrettably, ignoring every distinction of context and cir-
cumstance, the Legislature has seen fit to use very much the 
same brush in drawing boilerplate requirements for arbitration 
clauses in California real estate contracts as it used in creating 
Section 1295 in 1975. The statutory boilerplate requirements of 
Section 1298(a)-(c) are in force, however, and as noted they do 
apply not only to arbitration clauses in printed form contracts 
(and to hand-drafted arbitration clauses inserted into tailor able 
form contracts) but also, with equal force, to fully negotiated, 
individually drafted contracts (and to submission agreements).62 
Thus lawyers in real estate practice who wish to include arbitra-
tion clauses in contracts they draft need to insert the boilerplate 
language of Section 1298 (very carefully proofread and all in 
caps) into their word processor forms63-unless they wish to 
start cramming custom-drawn contracts onto commercial 
printed forms. 
III. SECTIONS 1298(d)-1298.7: CLEANING OUT THE 
CLOSET 
The remaining sections64 of the 1988 real estate arbitration 
enactment are something of a catchall. Some may be necessary, 
some wise enough if perhaps unnecessary and some ill-consid-
ered nonsense. Certainly no large legislative purpose can be 
ascribed to them as a group, except perhaps to say that they 
have little or nothing to do with the legislative purpose of Sec-
tions 1298(a)-(c).66 For purposes of this analysis, these disparate 
sections are best considered one by one, and to some extent out 
of the order in which they appear in the statute. 
51. See supra p. 313. 
52. See supra p. 321. 
53. As noted supra in note 17, however, care as to typeface may be in order if the 
word processor and associated printer are capable of producing what a court might con-
sider to be a "printed" rather than a "typed" contract. 
54. As to § 1298.8, see supra note 12. 
55. As to which see pp. 310-14, supra. 
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A. SECTION 1298(e): ESCROWHOLDER'S ESCAPE HATCH? 
Section 1298(e) provides: "In the event an arbitration provi-
sion is contained in an escrow instruction, it shall not preclude 
the right of an escrowholder to institute an interpleader action." 
There certainly may be some wisdom in preserving or carving 
out a remedy especially important to professional stakeholders, 
a remedy that may be difficult or even impossible to afford in 
arbitration if all who might legitimately claim a share in the 
stake are not party to the same arbitration agreement.1I6 
On the other hand, as drawn, the statute would appear to 
make it impossible to bind even a willing stakeholder to an arbi-
tration promise made in an escrow instruction. The remedy in 
such a case would appear to be a separate agreement embodying 
the arbitration promise-in effect, a submission agreement,1I7 al-
beit one that might be drawn concurrent with the original con-
tract. This clumsy procedure might be subject to more severe 
criticism if the problem invoking it seemed likely to arise with 
any frequency. (If it does arise, however, the draftsperson will 
omit the requisite boilerplate at his or her peril.) 
B. SECTION 1298(d): AN EXCESS OF CAUTION? 
Section 1298(d) reads: 
Nothing in this section [presumably the entirety 
of Section 1298] shall be construed to diminish 
the authority of any court of competent jurisdic- , 
tion with respect to real property transactions in 
areas involving court supervision or jurisdiction, 
including, but not limited to, probate, marital dis-
solution, foreclosure of liens, unlawful detainer or 
eminent domain. liS 
Standing alone, the phrase "areas involving court supervision or 
56. Or to two or more arbitration agreements that are subject to consolidation; CAL. 
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.3, a provision that has no parallel in either the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985) or in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9. U.S.C §§ 1-15 (West 
1970), allows for judicial consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings under the con-
ditions the.re set forth. It was this consolidation provision that was principally drawn 
into issue in Volt Information Sciences, Inc., v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see supra note 25. 
57. See supra p. 321. 
58. A.B. 405 added unlawful detainer to this list. See supra notes 5 and 16. 
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jurisdiction" seems a bit loose-jointed for a statute; arbitration 
itself, for example, could well be considered an "area" in which a 
court may be "involved" in "supervision or jurisdiction." Yet 
since it is hard to think of anything in Section 1298-substan-
tially all of which, except for this and the preceding short rump 
provisions, deals with boilerplate and more boilerplate-that 
could on any theory be contended to diminish the authority of 
any court anywhere, any risk on this branch seems a small one. 
There may be a more serious risk that this language, seem-
ingly otherwise unnecessary if not downright useless, might 
prompt some misguided challenge to the well-established notion 
that, unless limited by the arbitration agreement, an arbitrator 
has the power to award equitable or other non-monetary re-
lief-power especially important, if anywhere, in the real estate 
field. IIB 
C. SECTION 1298.5: A PASSING GRADE-ALMOST 
Section 1298.5 confirms the availability of a sound and effi-
cient procedure:60 concurrent filing of a notice lis pendens in a 
59. Indeed, under Rule 43, AAA Rules, supra note 39, at 19, the arbitrator is given 
the authority to "grant any remedy or relief that [he or she) deems just and equitable 
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties ... ," including, explicitly, specific 
performance of a contract. This grant of authority is generally understood to be, if any-
thing, broader than the authority of a court to afford relief. Cf. Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospital, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 250 Cal. Rptr. 478, (1988); Baker v. Sadick, 162 
Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1283.4. 
As to contractual and other limitations on the arbitrator's remedial authority, see 
Thompson v. Jespersen, 222 Cal. App. 3d 964, 272 Cal. Rptr. 132, (1990) (award of 
$75,000 in attorneys' fees and $10 in compensatory damages invalid under AAA Rule 43 
where parties' contract silent on attorneys' fees); Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, 
Brown & Assoc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1990) (award of damages for 
emotional distress vacated where no tort claims found to be within scope of issues sub-
mitted to arbitrator). It has even been held in one recent case involving private volun-
tary arbitration of intra-profession disputes that the arbitrators may be given the power 
to decline to arbitrate otherwise arbitrable disputes because of "the magnitude of the 
amount involved or the legal complexity of the controversy." Berke v. Hecht, 208 Cal. 
App. 463, 257 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1989). 
60. Section 1298.5 reads: 
Any party to an action who proceeds to record a notice of 
pending action pursuant to Section 409 [dealing with a "notice 
of pendency of action" or lis pendens) shall not thereby waive 
any right of arbitration which that person may have pursuant 
to a written agreement to arbitrate, nor any right to petition 
the court to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 1281.2, if, 
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judicial action relating to an arbitrable matter growing out of 
that action, and of an application to stay the court action pend-
ing arbitration-all without risking waiver of a right of arbitra-
tion, or of entitlement to petition the court to compel arbitra-
tion. It might be questioned whether a new enactment was 
entirely necessary to achieve this result: preexisting Section 
1281.4, which allows for stay of a pending action, probably al-
ready assured this result; and the cases on waiver suggest, if 
they do not squarely hold, that filing an action for the purpose 
of recording a notice lis pendens would not constitute waiver of 
the right to arbitrate.61 Still there seems little harm and the pos-
sibility of some good in providing a specific statutory warrant for 
this procedure. 
Even here, however, there lurks a possible ambiguity that 
could have potential for serious mischief. The opening sentence 
of Section 1298.5 begins, "Any party to an action who proceeds 
to record a notice of pending action pursuant to Section 409 ... 
. "-words that, whether taken alone or read in their actual con-
text, seem to speak of a party to an action previously filed. 
Sixty-odd words later, still in the same sentence, the Section 
reads, "[I]f, in filing an action to record that notice, the party 
at the same time presents to the court an application that the 
action be stayed pending arbitration .... " (Emphasis added.) 
This latter phrase seems not only to misread Section 409, gov-
erning the filing of such notices62 but also to require that, the 
in filing an action to record that notice, the party at the same 
time presents to the court an application that the action be 
stayed pending the arbitration of any dispute which is claimed 
to be arbitrable and which is relevant to the action. 
61. See Keating, supra notell (participation in a lawsuit alone not enough to con-
stitute waiver; "there must be judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable issues,") 31 
Cal. 3d at 605, 645 P.2d at 1204, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 372; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge 
District, 23 Cal. 3d 180, 588 P.2d 1261, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1979) (mere filing of suit by 
claimant not a waiver). Cf. Christensen v. Dewor Developments, 33 Cal. 3d 778, 661 P.2d 
1088, 191 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1983) (waiver under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.2{a) as deter-
mined by trial court affirmed); Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern California, 25 Cal. 3d 
418, 600 P.2d 1060, 158 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979) (waiver where insurer failed to advise in-
sured of availability of arbitration under insurance contract). 
62. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 409, itself not perhaps a model of clarity in all respects, 
provides, in relevant part: 
[P]laintiff, at the time of filing the complaint [in an action 
concerning real property or affecting the title or the right of 
possession of real property], ... or at any time afterwards, 
may record . . . a notice of the pendency of the action . . .. 
25
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"action" referred to be filed concurrent with an application to 
stay the arbitration. A trial judge aware of what is afoot, and of 
what is at stake, ought to be able to give Section 1298.5 the ef-
fect that was almost certainly intended: to allow a party to an 
action, in the words of Section 409, "concerning real property or 
affecting the title or the right of possession of real property," to 
file a notice lis pendens without waiving rights under an appli-
cable arbitration clause. This assumes, of course, that the party 
"at the same time"-presumably at the same time that the no-
tice is filed, not the same time that the underlying action was 
filed-applies to the court in which the action is pending for a 
stay pending arbitration. The language poses a quite unneces-
sary risk, however, that a court may try to make sense out of an 
attempt at literal reading of the language, with results that are 
hard to predict but that seem unlikely to be good. 
This unnecessary source of confusion or worse may trace to 
insufficiently careful attention to draftsmanship. It seems more 
likely, however, that it is the product of a careless borrowing of 
other statutory language not wholly apt here. A comparison of 
the language of Section 1298.5 with that of preexisting Section 
1281.5(a)63 suggests that the latter is the source of much of the 
former; in the following side-by-side comparison of the two sec-
tions, the identical language is italicized: 
(Emphasis added.) 
63. See supra note 4 and infra notes 93, 94 and 95. 
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Section 1298.5 Section 1281.5(a) 
Any party to an action who Any party to an action who 
proceeds to record a notice of proceeds to record and enforce 
pending action pursuant to a lien by commencement of an 
Section 409 shall not thereby action pursuant to [Cal. Civ. 
waive any right of arbitration Code §§ 3082-3267] shall not 
which that person may have thereby waive any right of ar-
pursuant to a written agree- bitration which that person 
ment to arbitrate, nor any right may have pursuant to a writ-
to petition the court to compel ten agreement to arbitrate if, 
arbitration pursuant to Section in filing an action to enforce 
1281.2, if, in filing an action to that claim of lien, the claimant 
record that notice, the party at at the same time presents to 
the same time presents to the the court an application that 
court an application that the the action be stayed pending 
action be stayed pending arbi- the arbitration of any issue, 
tration of any dispute which is question or dispute which is 
claimed to be arbitrable and claimed to be arbitrable under 
which is relevant to the action. the agreement and which is 
relevant to the action to en-
force the claim of lien. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in detail the dif-
ferences between filing an action to enforce a mechanic's lien 
and filing a notice lis pendens in a pending real property action. 
Two observations should suffice here. First, borrowing of lan-
guage in situations that are clearly parallel is without question a 
technique of statutory drafting much to be commended where 
appropriate. Second, however, the differences between the forms 
of interim relief dealt with in these two sections seem obvious 
enough to raise a clear alert to the risk of careless parallelism. 
Had that alert been heeded, the problem discussed here would 
almost cert!iinly have been identified and quite likely avoided. 
Certainly it would have been easier to avoid that problem in the 
drafting stage than it is now to foresee precisely what trouble 
may arise from the failure to avoid it. 
D. SECTION 1298.7: THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY 
One last substantive section of the new enactment remains 
to be confronted: Section 1298.7. To call it opaque is to flatter it. 
It provides: 
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In the event an arbitration provision is included 
in a contract or agreement covered by this title,64 
it shall not preclude or limit any right of action 
for bodily injury or wrongful death, or any right 
of action to which Section 337.1 or 337.15 is 
applicable.6& 
Section 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with patent 
deficiencies in buildings and improvements and Section 337.15 
with latent deficiencies in the survey of, or construction upon, 
real property. 
If "right of action" here means "right of action in a judicial, 
rather than in an arbitral, proceeding," then the lawmakers 
seem to have intended to provide that claims for bodily injury 
and wrongful death are, for some reason unstated and un-
fathomable, never to be arbitrable over the objection of a party 
to a real estate dispute, no matter what the agreed arbitration 
clause says. 
Granted that personal injury claims are not a commonplace 
in real estate contract disputes, still this would seem a surprising 
result indeed as to such claims, since, so far as appears, bodily 
injury claims are arbitrable under any other kind of arbitration 
clause covered by the California Arbitration Act, provided only 
that it is determined that the parties have so agreed. Section 
1295,66 for example, expressly applies to arbitration of claims of 
bodily injury or death resulting from "professional negligence of 
a health care provider"; and Section 1283.1 makes special provi-
sion for discovery in the arbitration of "disputes arising out of or 
resulting from any injury to, or death of, a person caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another."67 Likewise, there is no evi-
dent reason why causes of action under Sections 337.1 and 
337.15, unlike private rights of action arising under almost every 
other section of the Codes, should be forever barred from arbi-
tration over the objection of a party, when that party (and the 
others involved) have previously made an otherwise-binding 
agreement to arbitrate. 
64. CAL. CODE CIY. PROC. § 1298.7. 
65. See supra note 33. 
66. See supra note 25. 
67. See infra notes 94 & 101. 
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If, on the other hand, "right of action" means, as it ordina-
rily would, "a right of action cognizable in court unless the par-
ties have agreed to arbitrate it," then Section 1298.7 would seem 
to be designed to prevent anticipatory waiver of these rights by 
contract-but only in a real estate contract containing an arbi-
tration clause; surely this is an absurd result, if not an unin-
tended one. 
In all likelihood it will fall to some hapless band of future 
litigants to bear the burden of making some sense out of this 
legislative murk. 
This section has been described by one commentator as "a 
legislative compromise worked out between [the California Asso-
ciation of Realtors] and the California Trial Lawyers Association 
. . . . "68 The suggestion appears to be that the Trial Lawyers 
wanted to bar by statute the arbitration of all tort claims but 
that the compromise "reduced the exclusion of all tort causes of 
action to the bodily injury exclusion."69 Assuming that the Trial 
Lawyers had the legislative clout to accomplish in this circum-
stance what neither they nor anyone else has yet succeeded in 
doing anywhere else in the Arbitration Act, namely "exclusion of 
all tort causes of action" from arbitration,70 it is a shame that 
some minimal lawyerly standard of draftsmanship was not met 
in embodying this unfortunate "compromise." 
IV. BOILERPLATE ON A WIDER STAGE: GOOD FOR 
REAL ESTATE, GOOD FOR AMERICA? 
Beyond its impact upon arbitration of real estate disputes 
under California law, the boilerplate requirements of Section 
1298 serve to pose larger questions. For example, do the boiler-
plate warning requirements now on the books in Section 1298 
governing arbitration clauses in real estate contracts71 and in the 
earlier Section 1295, governing arbitration clauses in medical 
68. Caron, Arbitration of Real Estate Disputes, LA LAW., January 1990, at 33, 35 n. 
4. 
69. [d. The footnote goes on to say that § 1298.7, as compromised, "should preserve 
the right to arbitrate emotional distress claims, since 'bodily injury' is more restrictive 
than 'personal injury.' .. 
70. See supra p. 333. 
71. See supra pp. 310-14. 
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services contracts,72 suggest that there are more warning require-
ments to come? Certainly there is little evident logic in imposing 
boilerplate warning requirements in two specific fields as dispa-
rate as real estate and medical services73-but in no others. 
Perhaps it is to be anticipated, then, that the California 
Legislature will go on to direct, one at a time, the inclusion of 
boilerplate warnings in securities industry arbitration clauses, in 
lawyer-client fee arbitration agreements, in arbitration clauses in 
construction and architectural services contracts and so on. It 
remains to be seen whether, in the face of the clear rule that 
labor arbitration is governed by federal labor law,74 lawmakers 
might even go so far as to mandate the ultimate anomaly: re-
quiring inclusion of a boilerplate warning about the risks of arbi-
tration in a labor-management collective bargaining agreement. 
But if that is the trend to be anticipated, arbitration in Cal-
ifornia is already in trouble. For what is already on the books as 
to real estate arbitration clauses and medical service arbitration 
clauses is not just two warning language requirements-but two 
different warning language requirements. As noted,76 Section 
1295 requires a relatively simple 38-word warning in medical 
service contract arbitration clauses. Substantially the same 
warning in Section 1298, by contrast, runs to some 148 words.76 
There is nothing appetizing about the prospect of six, ten or 
a dozen different warning clauses in the Arbitration Act; but the 
most serious worry is the possibility of the ultimate "Balkaniza-
72. See supra note 25. 
73. See supra pp. 325·27. 
74. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Local 175, Teamsters 
Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967); Allis· 
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (1985); Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 
406, 411·413, 709 P.2d 826, 828·30, 220 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809·11 (1985) and cases there 
cited. C{. Graham v. Scissor·Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 828·31; 623 P.2d 165, 178·80; 171 
Cal. Rptr. 604, 617·19 (1981). 
75. See supra note 25. As there noted, the bold/all·cap requirement of § 1295(b) is 
accompanied by the requirement, in § 1295(a), of 103 additional words of boilerplate; 
this portion of the § 1295 boilerplate warning, however, tries to make fewer points and 
makes them in a way both that is easier to understand and that presents a better bal· 
anced comparison of arbitration to litigation; and it amounts as well to a complete man· 
dated arbitration clause. See supra notes 25 and 44. Also, the statute permits the 
"warnee" to read this portion of the boilerplate in upper and lower case. See supra note 
27. 
76. See supra p. 312. 
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tion" of the California law of arbitration that would follow from 
requiring different precise language in a host of different sub-
stantive areas. Should that happen, more and more arbitration 
clauses, homemade and otherwise, will be rendered unenforce-
able solely on the narrowest and least significant of technical 
grounds. In the case of professionally drafted arbitration agree-
. ments, attention of the draftsman will inevitably be drawn away 
from productive concerns, such as tailoring the clause to the spe-
cial requirements of the parties or the transaction, in favor of 
emphasis on including exactly the right boilerplate verbiage, in 
exactly the right order, in exactly the right typestyle and with 
exactly the right "line or space."77 
Moreover, if warning clauses proliferate, where there is pos-
sible overlap of subject matter in a single contract-for example 
a contract falling both under Section 1298 as to its real estate 
aspects and under a different warning section dealing with, say, 
construction contracts-there will lurk the absurd possibility of 
two different warning statements in the same contract-or, far 
worse, of litigation over the question whether the proper one of 
two possibly applicable statements was chosen. It may be ex-
treme to suggest that such a development would have the effect 
of repealing the "modern" California Arbitration Act, but the 
result would certainly constitute an unfortunate and wholly un-
warranted movement in that direction. 
Surely, if the Legislature in its wisdom is in fact committed 
to-or· susceptible to-the adoption of more widespread boiler-
plate warning requirements, it ought at least to bite the bullet 
and adopt a single comprehensive, decently worded piece of boil-
erplate applicable wherever a warning is thought necessary. 
In a still wider aspect, however, it is even possible to ask the 
unaskable question: whether mandated contract boilerplate has 
any real effect whatever in instructing and raising the conscious-
ness of the masses. Presumably it is for social researchers and 
educational psychologists to have the definitive last word on this 
question of efficacy. Pending their answer, however, the rest of 
us may be excused should we conclude, as a general matter, that 
77. See supra p. 313. As noted supra p. 318. even the formsellers-seemingly the 
principal beneficiaries of Sections 1298(aHc)-have had trouble getting it right. 
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the boilerplate device is at best rudimentary and unimaginative, 
clumsy and inflexible. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
explore alternative techniques of statutory draftsmanship in de-
tail; but it is impossible to believe that serious and thoughtful 
effort could not produce better, simpler, more flexible statutes 
that achieve whatever warning purpose the objective evidence 
suggests may be needed. No consumer problem, real or 
imagined, can possibly justify trussing up the Arbitration Act 
like a Thanksgiving turkey and stuffing it with the gizzards of 
legal verbiage. 
There is one final caution that the California Legislature 
ought to take, however unwillingly. The Federal Arbitration 
Act78 lies just over the horizon. 
Whether to this point the Federal Act has played much of a 
role in the arbitration of real estate disputes is a question of 
some uncertainty. Real estate transactions are probably less 
likely than many other types of commercial contracts to held to 
be "in" commerce; but the jurisdictional reach of the Federal 
Act extends beyond the channels of commerce themselves to ar-
bitration clauses in "contracts evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce,"79 -language that might well be held to reach at 
least some real estate transactions. The real reason for uncer-
tainty, however, is that, where the applicable provisions of the 
California and Federal acts are substantially identical-and in 
most aspects, California law has been scarcely less hospitable to 
arbitration than is Federal law8°-it has rarely been necessary to 
decide the question under which act a particular arbitration pro-
ceeds, whether in deciding a petition to confirm or vacate in the 
federal81 or state trial courts or in a case on appeal. 82 
78. 9 U.S.C §§1-15 (19 ). 
79. Id. § 2. 
80. But see p. 339, infra. 
81. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), discussed infra at note 83, obliges 
state courts to apply federal arbitration law in deciding arbitration cases that fall within 
the ambit of 9 U.S.C. § 2 (see supra note 25). It is much more doubtful that the Federal 
Arbitration Act affords an independent basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Corp, 350 U.S.198 (1956) (because arbitration law is "substan-
tive" for purposes of the Erie doctrine, a federal court may not apply the Federal Arbi-
tration Act in a case that is in federal court solely on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship.) Compare Frankfurter, J., concurring, id. at 205, 208 (it might be unconstitutional 
for the Congress to undertake specifically to make federal arbitration law applicable in 
diversity cases) with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) 
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Meanwhile, however, arbitration cases of California origin in 
fields outside of real estate, such as Southland Corp. v. KeatingS3 
and Perry v. Thomas,s. have gone far to suggest the wide sweep 
now being given to the Federal Act. These cases are noteworthy 
in this context because they are ones that state courts found not 
subject to arbitration under state law but that were found by the 
United States Supreme Court to be arbitrable under the Federal 
Act, thus preempting state law. 
Thus, should the process of Balkanization by boilerplate de-
scribed here proceed, with the· inevitable effect of making Cali-
fornia arbitration law substantially less arbitration-friendly than 
it has been, it is not impossible to imagine that vigorous advo-
cates and sensitized federal judges might combine forces to fed-
eralize local arbitration law right out from under the noses of a 
boilerplate-minded Legislature. 
V. AMENDING THE CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION ACT: 
SEARCH FOR TOMORROW 
It would certainly be fair to characterise the foregoing as 
almost unremittingly critical of the enactment of Sections 1298-
1298.8. Readers who have stayed the course to this point mayor 
may not agree with that criticism. It is perhaps unnecessary to 
(Fortas, J.) (in a diversity case, a contract "evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce" under 9 U.S.C. § 2 is governed by the federal arbitration act; no constitutional 
question is presented because Congress has not "fashion[edl federal substantive rules to 
govern ... simple diversity cases .... " but rather has "prescribe[dl how federal courts 
are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has 
power to legislate." Id. at 405). See also infra note 83. 
82. Cf. Volt Information Sciences, Inc., v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
University, 489 U.S. 468, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989), discussed supra at notes 25 and 42. 
83. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (provision of California Franchise Investment Law, interpreted 
by the California Supreme Court to mean that arbitration of disputes covered by the 
provision cannot be compelled into arbitration, is preempted by the Federal Arbitration 
Act where, per § 2 thereof, the contract "evidences a transaction involving commerce"). 
84. 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (in a dispute over compensation in the securities industry, 
the Federal Arbitration Act preempts provision of California Labor Code expressly pro-
viding that arbitration cannot be compelled in such a case). See also Cook v. Barratt 
American, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 768 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1990) op. withdrawn by order 
of ct. (7/11/90), 1990 Cal. LEX IS 3021, cert. den. 1191 US LEXIS, 111 S.Ct. 2052 (1991). 
(under federal arbitration law applicable to contract of employment, arbitration clause 
may be enforced as to sex discrimination claim under state law; refusal of a federal Court 
of Appeals in another case to compel arbitration of federal law sex discrimination claim 
not "persuasive precedent"). 
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agree with every word of the foregoing, however, in order to ac-
cept this conclusion: by no measure can Sections 1298-1298.8 be 
taken as any appropriate indication that real estate arbitration 
in California-or at least under California law-has in any sense 
come of age. The arbitration of real estate disputes may be com-
ing into its own by virtue of other forces,811 and that process will 
no doubt be aided by the addition of form arbitration clauses to 
many widely-accepted California real estate forms,86 but the 
process would be far better off, on balance, without Sections 
1298-1298.8;87 certainly any increased use of arbitration clauses 
in form real estate contracts-or in real estate contracts of any 
other kind-was in no way dependent upon their enactment.88 
If Sections 1298-1298.8 do not evidence the coming of age of 
real estate arbitration in California, is it possible that their en-
85. See supra note 11. 
86. Although it is no part of the purpose of this article to undertake a general cri-
tique of California real estate forms apart from the points on arbitration discussed here, 
one wider-ranging editorial comment can perhaps be made relevant here by observing 
that the highly questionable practice it embodies is in no way required by anything in 
Sections 1298-1298.8. 
The practice in question, initially adopted by at least one form publisher, sets up 
the arbitration clause in such a way that, if the parties to the contract do not both agree 
either to include or to exclude the clause, they have no contract but rather must regard 
the last to elect as having made a counter offer. See Professional Publishing Corp. Form 
101-RA CAL (5-89) ~ 46, which so requires as to the liquidated damages clause, as to the 
arbitration clause and, indeed, as to the otherwise-much-to-be-commended mediation 
clause, id. ~ 37. 
Treating the liquidated damages clause in this way may be both realistic and desira-
ble-and as to some classes of real estate contracts perhaps even necessary under Cali-
fornia's strict rules governing liquidated damages clauses; see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1671 and 
1675-81, particularly at § 1677 (which, incidentally, may be a part of the history of the 
Legislature's fascination with bold type and red print). But, important and valuable as 
arbitration and mediation can be, there seems little reason to make them into potential 
deal-breakers for parties-and agents-where the substantive terms of the transaction 
are otherwise fully agreed upon. 
In any event, nothing in §1298(c)-or for that matter in any other part of §§ 1298-
1298.8-requires this treatment of the arbitration clause. See supra note 3. 
As discussed supra at p. 313, §§ 1298(a)-(c) require a separate "line or space" for 
"assent or nonassent to the arbitration provision"-but these sections do not require two 
spaces, one for assent, the other for "nonassent." It would be perfectly permissible, 
under the statute, for the form to provide that the arbitration clause is incorporated into 
the contract if assented to by both (or all) parties, but not otherwise-a format fre-
quently used in the forms to deal with other variable or negotiable terms and conditions 
of the contract. 
87. As noted supra at pp. 328 and 329-31, a clarified § 1298.5, and perhaps a modi-
fied § 1298(e), might be worth salvaging. 
88. See supra p. 308. 
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actment nevertheless marks in some way the maturation of the 
California Arbitration Act as a whole? The twenty-seven years 
between 1961 and 1988 do not match the human standard for 
maturity, but as the venerable Statute of Frauds bears witness, 
the life cycle of statutes does not necessarily parallel that of 
lawyers. 
Like all historical processes that survive, common law arbi-
tration was by and large a seamless, internally consistent system 
that meshed effectively with the larger social systems of which it 
was a part. The adoption of so-called "modern" arbitration stat-
utes in the 1920's89 and thereafter vastly strengthened the arbi-
tration process by providing for specific enforcement of the arbi-
tration promise and for the stay of any pending judicial 
proceeding addressing, on the merits, the same issues as those 
encompassed by the arbitration promise.90 In due course over 
the next generation and more, this change-powerful in impact 
but narrow and focussed in scope::-was duly accommodated 
both within the arbitration process and within the larger social 
order, so that the former retained-or at least 
regained-internal consistency, and so that reasonable systemic 
harmony was maintained. 
Changes such as those embodied in the Uniform Arbitration 
Act91 and in the substantial elaboration and refinement of that 
Act entailed in the 1961 revision of the California Arbitration 
Act92 have been made with careful consideration of the systems 
into which they were being inserted; and by and large these 
89. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-17, enacted in 1925; N.Y. Arbitration Act of 1920, now N.Y. CIV. 
PRAC. §§ 7501-7510; 1927 Cal. Stat. ch. 225; Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985). 
See also First Report of the Judicial Council of Cal. 20-21 (1926). For an interesting 
discussion of the history of California arbitration law, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Superior Court, 227 Cal.App.3d 51, 277 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1991). 
90. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1281-1281.2; 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4; Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act §§ 1-2,7 U.L.A. 5-69 (1985). Whether a statute as spare as the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (and as ambiguous; cf. the distinction seemingly drawn between "courts of the 
United States" in § 3 and "any United States District court" in § 4), although "modern" 
in the limited sense discussed here, is really modern in the state-of-the-art sense, is an 
important question by no means unrelated to the questions addressed here; it is, how-
ever, beyond the scope of this article. 
91. Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985). 
92. See generally Recommendation Relating to Arbitration (Dec. 1960), 3 Cal. Law 
Revision Com.; Feldman, Arbitration Modernized--The New California Arbitration Act, 
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 413 (1961); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 227 
Cal.App.3d 51, 277 Cal.Rptr. (1991), supra note 89. 
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changes have been accommodated smoothly. 
That careful, comprehensive process does not appear, how-
ever, to have been characteristic of most subsequent amend-
ments of the California Arbitration Act. With the exception of 
the provisions of the extraordinarily comprehensive Title added 
in 1988 dealing with arbitration and conciliation of international 
commercial disputes,98 the amendments to the Act since 1961 
appear to have been made essentially piecemeal. 94 Some are wor-
93. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1297.11-.432. Except as to §§ 1297.341-.432 dealing with 
conciliation, this enactment is based substantially upon the Model Law, 24 I.L.M. 1302 
(1985), promulgated by the United Nations Commission on Internation Trade Law, an 
organization ordinarily identified by the acronym UNCITRAL. See generally Golbert 
and Kolkey, California's New International Arbitration and Conciliation Code, LA 
LAW., November 1988 at 46. But see Garvey & Heffelfinger, Toward Federalizing U.S. 
International Commercial Arbitration Law, 25 INT'L LAW. 209 (1991), for the view that 
state by state adoption of versions of the UNCITRAL Model Law threatens to under-
mine the uniformity and predictability upon which users of international arbitration de-
pend. In a striking parallel to the view expressed herein (discovered on the eve of the 
press deadline, which coincided with publication of the Garvey & Heffelfinger article), 
these authors conclude, id. at 220-21, that this "Balkanization" of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law may discourage, rather than encourage, the use of arbitration in international 
commercial transactions. See supra p. 336. See also Spalding, When Federal and State 
Measures Clash, S.F. Banner Daily J., June 27, 1989 at 4, col. I, where the notion of 
"Balkanization" is advanced. This was the last of a series of five articles on the enact-
ment of §§ 1298-1298.8 that appeared in this newspaper between June 21 and 27, 1989, 
in which some of the ideas in this article were first presented. 
Oddly, presumably because both were added in the 1988 session of the Legislature, 
both the international arbitration and conciliation article, §§ 1297.11-.432, and the real 
estate contract arbitration article, §§ 1298-1298.8, are identified as "Title 9.3" of CAL. 
CODE CIV. PROC. 
94. Additions to, and amendments of, the 1961 Arbitration Act have included: 
§ 1280.1, providing quasi-judicial immunity to arbitrators, 
added in 1985 and reenacted in 1990 to extend a "sunshine" 
provision that originally called for the provision to expire in 
1991. See infra note 97. 
§ 1281.3, providing for consolidation of separate arbitrations, 
added in 1978. See supra note 55. 
§ 1281.5, allowing for judicial enforcement of a mechanic's lien 
without waiver of the right to arbitrate, added in 1977 and 
further amended in 1989. See supra note 4. 
§ 1281.7, allowing for filing a petition to compel arbitration in 
lieu of an answer to a complaint, added in 1987. 
§ 1281.8, affording several provisional judicial remedies with-
out waiver of the right to arbitrate, added in 1989. See supra 
note 4 and p. 329-31. 
§ 1282.6, providing for subpoenas in arbitration, an original 
section amended in 1982 to provide for issuance of subpoenas 
"as of course, signed but otherwise in blank .... " §§ 1283.05 
and 1283.1, providing for discovery in arbitrations involving 
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thy beyond doubt;9D others are well intended, if not models of 
draftsmanship;96 at least one, Section 1280.1 dealing with arbi-
trator immunity, was a specific response to an unexpected judi-
cial holding;97 and one, Section 1282.6 dealing with subpoenas in 
arbitration, boldly cuts away, as to arbitration, much of the 
personal injury (and permitting parties in other classes of 
cases to incorporate these provisions by agreement), added in 
1970. See supra p. 333 and infra pp. 343-44 and note 101. 
§ 1291, providing for a statement of decision on a petition, on 
request, an original section amended in 1983 to add cross ref-
erence to the statement of decision provisions of CAL. CODE 
CIV. PROC. § 632. 
§ 1292.2, providing venue for a petition after commencement 
of an arbitration, an original section amended in 1978 to pro-
vide for arbitrations held outside the State. 
§ 1296, providing that parties to a public construction contract 
may agree to have the arbitrator's award conform to the law 
and be supported by substantial evidence, added in 1979. See 
infra note 99 and p. 346. 
Section 1295, added in 1975, is discussed supra in note 20 and passim herein; §§ 
1297.11-.432, added in 1988, are discussed supra in note 93; §§ 1298-1298.8, also added in 
1988, are, of course, the principal subject of this article. 
95. Sections 1281.5 -.8, outlined supra in note 94, are examples that seem to fall 
fairly into this category. Cf. § 1298(e), discussed supra at p. 328 and §1298.5, discussed 
supra at pp. 329-31. As to § 1281.5, see also pp. 331-32. 
96. Sections 1283.05-.1, outlined supra in note 94, certainly claims the prize for pro-
lixity within the Arbitration Act, if not within the whole of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure-and perhaps would be a contender even in the entire body of California statutory 
law. 
97. The case is Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979,189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983),in 
which the parties to an arbitration sought to sue the arbitrator for his failure to issue an 
award in the seven months following submission of the case to him after the close of 43 
days of hearings that had extended over more than three years. The trial court sustained 
the defendant's demurrer; the appellate court reversed on the ground that in these cir-
cumstances the arbitrator could not claim the quasi-judicial immunity that had generally 
been supposed to insulate arbitrators from virtually all claims arising out of their service 
as arbitrators. 
As originally enacted in 1985, Section 1280.1 included a "sunshine" provision calling 
for its automatic repeal, unless later reenacted, in 1991. Perhaps such provisions are sen-
sible in statutes that enact programs or create bureaucracies that are or may be a signifi-
cant ongoing burden on government, or on some definable constituency; they are, how-
ever, mindless in the case of a provision such as this, which could be repealed, without 
fiscal or bureaucratic impact, on any day that suited the Legislature. Apparently the 
sunshine clause was included here only because such clauses were fashionable at the 
time. Sadly, when the effort made necessary by the sunshine clause to bring about the 
reenactment of § 1280.1 (this time without a sunshine provision), was put forth in 1990, 
it became entangled with another proposal to extend immunity to mediators-perhaps a 
good idea but a very different proposition and wholly new to the statutes. The result, in 
S. B. No. 1951, was the reenactment of § 1280.1 with another sunshine clause, this time 
expiring on January 1, 1996-by which time a commission created by the Bill is to have 
studied and reported on the wisdom of mediator immunity. 
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freight of a long and complex series of statutory provisions ap-
plicable to subpoenas in judicial proceedings.98 But all except for 
the international Title have been conceived through a more or 
less narrow lens. 
Some, such as the real estate provisions of Sections 1298-
1298.8 and the medical malpractice provisions of Section 1295, 
have been sponsored by groups or entities having special inter-
ests, however legitimate. And as noted,99 these two portions of 
the Arbitration Act remain the only two that are subject-matter 
specific. 
So far, nothing that has been done to the Act, either by way 
of narrow incremental change or by more comprehensive amend-
ment, has proved to be the stick that broke the spokes, or the 
grime that froze the bearings, of the arbitration process; but 
there remains such a potential. The foregoing discussion of the 
provisions of Sections 1298-1298.8100 suggests one class of pos-
sibilities, and there may be other examples. For instance, al-
though it is useful and convenient to be able to import essen-
tially the full panoply of civil discoveryl0l into arbitrations, 
where the parties have so agreed, simply by reference to Section 
1283.05,102 and although some trial lawyers maintain as an arti-
cle of faith that it is impossible fairly and efficiently to adjudi-
cate any case without full discovery rights, if every arbitration 
98. Section 1282.6, outlined supra in note 94, eliminates in arbitration the require-
ment of an affidavit showing "good cause" accompanying a subpoena duces tecum under 
§ 1985(b); a subpoena in arbitration need not be issued by a judge, clerk of court or 
attorney at law, as under §§ 1985(c) and 1986 (although it must be issued by "a neutral 
agency ... or by the neutral arbitrator"); there is no provision for motions or orders to 
quash, as in § 1987.1; and so on. Section 1286.2 does invoke the machinery of §§ 1985-97 
as to service and enforcement (perhaps including the potential for a judicial order to 
quash or to require a "good cause" affidavit); and it applies only to appearance or pro-
duction at an arbitration hearing, unless an evidentiary deposition is ordered by the ar-
bitrator under § 1283, or unless §§ 1283.05 and 1283.1 (see supra p. 333 and note 94 and 
infra p. 343-44 and note 101) apply or have been invoked by the parties. 
99. See supra p. 308. Section 1296 does apply only to public construction contracts, 
but, as discussed infra at p. 346, this section appears to add little or nothing of substance 
to the law governing such contracts. See also supra note 94. 
100. See supra pp. 334-338. 
101. Although no one may ever know all that lurks in the prolixity of § 1283.1 (see 
supra note 96), to all superficial appearances it embraces the substance of CAL. CODE CIV. 
PROC. §§ 2016-34. Section 1283.l(e), however, does depart from these sections in requir-
ing approval of the arbitrator for the taking of any deposition. 
102. CAL. CODE elv. PROC. § 1283.1 authorizes this. See supra pp. 333 and notes 94 
and 101. 
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agreement incorporated Section 1283.1 by reference, arbitration 
would look and act that much more like civil litigation than it 
now does; and lawyers who believe that omitting or sharply cur-
tailing discovery can be advantageous in some-or even 
many-instances would be deprived of the valuable alternative 
that arbitration now affords them in this respect. Indeed, while 
each move toward "judicialization" of arbitration may increase 
the comfort level of trial lawyers unfamiliar with the alternative 
process, any such gain is inevitably achieved at the cost of a loss, 
pro tanto, of a genuine, and sometimes a clearly preferable, 
alternative. 
More worrisome is what may be to come. Scarcely a bar as-
sociation worth its dues now lacks a committee that looks into 
arbitration matters, and some have more than one. loa The work 
of each is known to its active participants, but cross contact oc-
curs largely by chance and joint effort is largely unknown, at 
least until a proposal makes its way before the Conference of 
Delegates of the State Bar. Each such committee presumably 
has what sorpe certainly have: well-meaning members, often rel-
atively newly interested in the fine points of arbitration, who 
have become deeply concerned about some particular aspect of 
the process-typically an aspect in which arbitration differs ma-
terially from the familiar litigation process. Shouldn't there be 
discovery in every arbitration-after all, how is it possible to try 
a case-at least the kind of cases I do-without discovery? Isn't 
it troubling that the arbitrator is not bound to follow the law--
shouldn't that be required? If the arbitrator can ignore the rules 
of evidence, the award may be based on just anything-how can 
you put up with that? How about appeal on the merits-should 
parties ever be obliged to accept the crap shoot of just one bite 
at the substantive apple? And so on. 
From such well-intentioned sources, from individuals or 
from interest groups may come suggestions whose proponents 
103. The author, for example, is a member or officer of three committees of the Bar 
Association of San Francisco that have some concern with arbitration, the Arbitration 
Committee, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee and the Committee on Arbi-
tration of Fee Disputes; and of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee of the 
Litigation Section of the State Bar. There are at least two other committees within the 
State Bar that are concerned with arbitration, one the Committee on Mandatory Arbi-
tration of Fee Disputes and the other the ADR Subcommittee of the Standing Commit-
tee on Legal Services for Middle Income Persons. 
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have not bothered to think through the full impact of their pro-
posal upon the rest of the Act, or, worse, who do not yet really 
sufficiently understand the process they seek to alter. It has 
been suggested throughout this article that Sections 1298-1298.8 
may be an example of an amendment idea that belongs in one of 
these categories. 
A proposal made to, but not adopted by, the 1990 Confer-
ence of Delegates of the State Bar of California provides another 
example. In effect it would have made the provisions of Section 
1296,104 now limited in terms to public construction contracts, 
applicable to all arbitrations under the California Act. All that 
Section 1296 now says is that parties to a public construction 
contract may expressly agree that the arbitrator's award must be 
supported by law and substantial evidence. Since the parties to 
any contract including an arbitration clause are at absolute lib-
erty to bind themselves to an arbitration subject to such rules; 
and since, under Section 1286.2(d), one of the sharply limited 
number of grounds upon which a court may overturn an award 
is that the "arbitrators exceeded their powers"-powers that, by 
one of the most venerable and best-respected rules in the law, 
come solely from the parties' arbitration agreement;IOCI to all ap-
pearances this is a result, that could have been achieved with 
equal ease with or without Section 1296. And of course the Arbi-
tration Act already provides fully for appeal of any final trial 
court disposition of an arbitration award, whether by confirma-
tion or by vacatur. lOS 
These are the risks posed by the friends of arbitration; the 
risks posed by its enemies are more insidious. Almost no one at-
tacks arbitration frontallyl07-whether for lack of courage or wit 
to take it on; or for fear of defeat on the merits, or of a judicial 
or public relations backlash because of arbitration's good press 
in judicial opinionsl08 and elsewhere; or for other reasons. But 
there is some evidence in the history of Sections 1298-1298.8 of 
104. See supra notes 94 and 99. 
105. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960). 
106. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1294-1294.2. 
107. See supra note 13. 
108. There are exceptions that may prove the rule. See, e.g., Shapiro, Arbitration 
May Not Be Best Option in Franchise Disputes, S.F. Daily J., October 12, 1990, at 5, 
col. 1. 
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the kind of opportunity that may be presented to arbitration's 
detractors. Among the spiky shards of verbal mandate in Sec-
tions 1298(a)-(c) there are not only far too many opportunities 
for ingenious counsel to unearth just the no-nothing technicality 
that will defeat the fair agreement to arbitrate that the parties 
had reached;lo9 but also far too accessible a pattern for slowing 
or stopping the engine of arbitration in other fields. 110 In the 
obscurity of Section 1298.7111 lie far too many opportunities not 
only to drag into court, in order to keep them out of arbitration, 
particular cases that heretofore would have gone smoothly 
through the alternative process; but also to claim a precedent for 
irrational curtailment of the freedom of contract that has here-
tofore allowed willing parties to virtually any kind of dispute to 
make a binding agreement to resolve it by arbitration. 
Legislation is important business-too important, some 
would no doubt say, to be left to legislators,112 but certainly too 
important to be taken up as a hobby or on an ego trip. Most 
emphatically, it is too important to be undertaken by those, in 
the Legislature or out, who fail or refuse to understand the im-
port or effect of what they set out to do; or to be abandoned to 
the devices whose real purpose is to undercut the process they 
claim to perfect. 
Unfortunately, arbitration statutes seem a particularly at-
tractive target for the interloper. Perhaps because of the long-
time promotion of the notion of the citizen-arbitrator as an 
ideal, arbitration, including the making of statute law governing 
arbitration, is too often regarded a kind of amateur undertaking, 
at which any number of novices can play. 
Moreover, in many of its aspects arbitration seems simple. 
It is often billed as simpler that the judicial process, and in 
many ways it is.11s Indeed, one of the geniuses of arbitration 
109. See supra pp. 310-14. 
110. See supra pp. 334-38. 
111. See supra pp. 332-33. 
112. See Prop. 140 Fallout May Harm State Law, S.F. Daily J., February 5, 1991, at 
1, col. 2, suggesting, under the subhead, "Some Fear Departure of Experienced Staff 
Members Will Result in Sloppy Statutes," that legislative draftsmanship is not likely to 
improve in the immediate future. 
113. The American Arbitration Association, for example, administers thousands of 
cases each year (see supra note 11) under rules that can be printed comfortably in a 
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may be that it can seem so simple to those involved in individual 
cases as arbitrators or advocates. Yet despite such appearances, 
as an article on so simple an arbitration topic as this one may 
suffice to illustrate, arbitration is, in many of its dimensions, a 
process of very considerable subtlety and complexity. And when, 
out of an excess of subtlety or complexity or otherwise, an arbi-
tration goes wrong, the whole rationale for it is likely to be sub-
stantially defeated; for an arbitration gone wrong is almost cer-
tainly an arbitration headed for the courts-an outcome that it 
was the very purpose of the parties' arbitration promise to avoid. 
Although the great bulk of arbitrated cases pass through the 
channels of the process without difficulty or delay, a party or 
counsel committed to frustrating the process can find a thou-
sand snags on which to try to catch the case. An arbitrator well 
schooled in the process and fully familiar with the scope of his 
or her powers, practical as well as legal/ u can thwart most such 
attempts, particularly if supported by an able administrator 
from a neutral administrative organization;llII but each new trap 
laid, deliberately or inadvertently, in the Arbitration Act creates 
new opportunities to detour the process, and some proportion of 
such attempts inevitably will succeed. Where the new trap is one 
that invokes, or provides an opening for, judicial intervention, 
the problem may be much magnified; for by definition the arbi-
trator cannot resolve it alone, and the judge to whom it comes, 
even if understanding of and sympathetic to arbitration, may 
know or learn little of the history or background of the case. A 
case suspended or ensnared in the nether world between court 
and arbitrator may all too easily suffer the worst that each of 
these processes has to offer. 
Although trouble can often be avoided when an arbitration 
matter can be kept out of court, the inevitable tradeoff is that 
arbitration is carried on for the most part out of range of close 
supervision by the judiciary. This fact not only makes room for 
the occasional judge who can defeat arbitration out of ignorance 
pocket-sized pamphlet of 28 pages. AAA Rules, supra note 39. Even the somewhat more 
complex NAT'L ASS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS, A CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE (as 
amended June 18, 1990) fits onto 40 pocket-sized pages. 
114. See Spalding, Avoiding Delay in Arbitration: Counsel's Role, ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION NEWSALERT, CALIFORNIA EDITION 1, 2 (March 1991), 
115. Id. at 3-4. 
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or hostility, but it also denies to arbitration many of the power-
ful built-in process protections enjoyed, and regularly used, by 
the courts. Because so much of what is done in arbitration never 
finds its way into court, and because its first-hand participants, 
arbitrators and advocates, are not in a position themselves to 
keep the process as a whole (as distinct from the case before 
them) on track, the machinery provided by the statutes must be 
capable of running smoothly and correctly by itself most of the 
time. The only minders of the process who are always on duty 
are the administrators, and, vital though their role can be, they 
are, compared with a judge or even with an arbitrator, largely 
powerless. lI6 In the case of arbitration, then, systemic internal 
consistency is more than an artifact of a process that has sur-
vived; it is a day-to-day necessity. 
Sadly, Sections 1298-1298.8 stand on the statute books as 
Exhibit A demonstrating, within a relatively narrow compass, 
just how far from this necessary goal the positive law of arbitra-
tion can be led, and with what apparent ease such a detour can 
be made. Left to themselves, these Sections may survive, and be 
survived, with only a modicum of additional useless effort and 
with only the occasional extravagant financial hemorrhage or 
outrageous miscarriage of justice to be borne by such poor in-
nocents as fall prey to its traps. Should the California Arbitra-
tion Act become much more cluttered with this kind of half-
thought-out claptrap, however, arbitration under California law, 
whatever favored status the courts may say it enjoys, may well 
grind to a dismal, painful halt. This would be a most unfortu-
nate result, but perhaps no worse than should be expected if 
"reform" is left to ill-informed or interested tinkering at the 
margins of what was once, perhaps, the premier state arbitration 
act. 
Thus, if the California Arbitration Act· is in fact coming of 
age, a more suitable observance of its maturity might well be for 
the Legislature to resolve, whether by statute, rule or custom, to 
empanel a statewide advisory panel available on call to review, 
and to comment to the Legislature upon, the process implica-
tions of any legislative proposal to amend the Act. ll7 Where nec-
116. [d. at 4. 
117. A collateral benefit might be that such an advisory group could study, and pro-
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essary in order to evaluate the kind of anecdotal horror stories 
sometimes marshalled in order to justify some proposed sweep-
ing change, this group could also be made responsible for gather-
ing and interpreting, for the benefit of the Legislature, objective, 
comprehensive evidence of what problems do in fact exist in the 
arbitration process and what solutions might be devised to solve 
them in a way that does not threaten the whole. . 
Without question it is the role of the Legislature to enact; 
but at least in this field if not in others, that body should act 
only with a full and fair understanding of the import and pro-
spective impact of what it proposes to do. 
That understanding, it seems fair to conclude, the Legisla-
ture could not have had in enacting Sections 1298-1298.8. 
pose ways to harmonize, the growing number of references to, and attempts to use, arbi-
tration (or something called arbitration) scattered throughout the Codes. Although a cat-
alogue of such Code references is well beyond the scope of this article, one venerable but 
probably little-known real-estate-related example may be cited by reference to Cal. Civ. 
Code § 845(c), providing for non-binding arbitration by a court-appointed "impartial" 
(not "neutral"; see supra note 47) arbitrator. See also Healy v. Onstott, 192 Cal. App. 3d 
612, 237 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1987). 
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